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ABSTRACT 
     These are challenging times for new entrepreneurial firms. The development of the 
Global Financial Crisis shook the very foundations of global markets and institutions that 
most firms relied on to do business (Claessens, et al., forthcoming). In the midst of 
institutional flux and resource constraints, entrepreneurial firms, which have been shown 
to make a range of contributions to the economy (van Praag & Versloot 2007) faced 
increasing constraints. The Australian Federal Government quickly implemented the 
Green Loan program in response to the financial crisis. Unfortunately, the green loans 
program was flawed with obsolete processes and information (Faulkner, 2011), further 
constraining new firms. Prior research provides few clues regarding how resource-
constrained entrepreneurial firms deal with these institutional flaws within institutional 
change and how they might overcome these challenges and prosper. 
 
     One promising theory that evaluates behavioural responses to constraints and 
institutional flaws is bricolage (Levi Strauss, 1967).  Bricolage aligns with notions of 
resourcefulness: defined here as “making do by applying combinations of the resources at 
hand to new problems and opportunities” (Baker and Nelson 2005: 333). Using three case 
studies, we consider how institutional flaws impact firm behaviours and illustrate the use 
of bricolage in attempts to reinforce, shape and change the GL program further extending 
bricolage domains of Baker and Nelson (2005). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
     The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was a potent reminder of the interconnectedness of 
the world economy (Chesters and Western 2012).  Whilst world markets in mid 2008 
held their collective breaths in anticipation of the fallout from the Lehman Brothers 
 
 
collapse, the Australian Federal Government quickly implemented several stimulus 
packages aimed at enabling the Australian economy to remain strong, halt further 
economic decline: by kick start and sustaining employment including sustainability 
programs like the Green Loan (GL) program  
 
     The GL program was seen by many entrepreneurs as a panacea for market uncertainty. 
As the GFC progressed the rules of doing business changed as markets that were once 
guaranteed were delayed or no longer available, and promised resources, needed for new 
firm development (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003) vanished under firm cost cutting and 
austerity measures. As a Federal Government program, Green Loans provided a range of 
benefits and also instigated mandatory institutional rules and processes that required 
compliance for entrepreneurs to be involved in the program and to receive payment for 
assessment work.  Prior research in institutional theory has evaluated the role of 
institutional entrepreneurs to create new institutions (Di Maggio, 1988) but very few 
studies evaluate the actions of entrepreneurs within local environments and how they 
respond to institutional obsolescence on top of existing resource constraints. 
Understanding how firms cope with challenges and defy or comply with institutions and 
attempt to influence institutional change may have important ramifications for the ways 
new firms use and develop their resources to persevere and grow. This research may also 
provide for the evaluation of how new firms deal with Government programs that are 
designed to enhance entrepreneurial activities which may facilitate program design to 
bring the most benefit for new entrepreneurial ventures and assist in the development of 
stronger more resilient firms. 
 
     The paper is structured as follows.  We first consider institutional literature, and prior 
work evaluating bricolage and institutions.  We then evaluate the GL program from its 
inception: and highlight the shifts including its rebranding to Green Start in attempts to 
change institutional structures.  We then consider its acknowledged flaws and early 
obsolescence as well as firms’ responses to these institutional structures and their 
attempts to attempt to modify existing institutional logics.  We conclude by discussing 
the theoretical and practical implications of our findings. 
 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
     Institutional theory evaluates the ways in which differing structures and processes 
shape organizations (Scott, 1995). Prior literature in institutional theory has tended to 
focus on explaining structures, schemas, rules, norms, and routines that assist in 
maintaining the status quo of social and organizational behaviour “organisations must 
follow the rules if they are to receive support and legitimacy” (Scott, 1995:132). He 
 
 
further suggests the 3 pillars of regulative, normative and cognitive institutions, which 
help explain many observed common patterns of organizational behaviour. 
Paradoxically, whilst traditional institutional theory describes conforming to existing 
values (Garud et al., 2007)  the basis of entrepreneurship firmly rests within notions of 
change and “gales of creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1934) which challenges the 
status quo through new institutional logics.  
 
     Within institutional change, firms jostle for position in an attempt to establish 
standards, scripts and patterns of behaviours that ultimately become the institution that is 
followed (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). However, within these attempts not all processes 
and structures are relevant and appropriate for all firms. Prior literature focuses on 
deinstitutionalisation whereby institutional practices fall into disuse and institutions 
decay through the lack of practise within the micro level of organisational behaviors 
(Zucker 1988). Some structures and rules will be discarded and deigned as obsolete and 
others will change as the dominant institutional logic emerges.   
 
     Evolving institutions can further be shaped by government policy (Spencer, Murtha, & 
Lenway, 2005). Government intervention through offering incentives may reduce 
perceived market risks and new firms often take advantage of this (Hajer, 2003). Policies 
are designed to legitimise new institutional fields and create new employment however; 
these may ultimately restrict institutional change through legal regulations, with pressures 
to conform to procedural requirements, further limiting changes within institutions. This 
paradox of embedded agency of both constraining and enabling firms sits within most 
current debates of institutional theory (Seo & Creed, 2001).  
 
     As a consequence of criticisms in institutional theory (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), 
there has been a recent shift towards focusing on the institutional entrepreneur (Battilana, 
Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009). This burgeoning literature considers the “self interested 
agents who commands resources to alter or create new institutions” (York & Hen, 
2011:1). This assumption of commanding resources is problematic as most new firms not 
only face internal resource constraints (Davidsson & Honig, 2003), but often operate in 
resource poor environments (Kodithuwakku & Rosa, 2002). Further, the specific 
mechanisms within this resource process are not clear. How do entrepreneurs respond to 
altering or changing institutions when resources are already limited? 
 
BRICOLAGE AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
 
     When faced with resource challenges, some firms -- through a refusal to enact 
limitations -- chose to make do with existing resources to create novel solutions for new 
purposes (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Bricolage, first articulated in work by Levi-Strauss 
(1966) considers how human actors relate to their environment and the meanings ascribed 
to objects through elements of myths, and accepted social rules and constraints. Levi 
Straus proposed a bricoleur (a person that engages in bricolage) is (1967:4) “trying to 
make his way out of and to go beyond the constraints imposed by a particular state of 
civilization.” Through an in-depth understanding of resources, bricoleurs use creativity 
and through iteratively tinkering with resources at hand, further defines and redefines 
existing resource meanings and scope to create novel combinations towards purposes for 
which they were not originally intended. In this process, firms engaged in bricolage 
frequently use resources other firms may value as worthless or unacceptable, ingeniously 
pushing the boundaries of constraints through salvaging, recovering or repurposing 
existing resources through acts of retranslation and meaning for novel solutions. 
 
    Bricolage has travelled from its structuralist anthropology origins and has been used in 
a variety of literatures (c.f. Baker & Nelson for a review) including institutional change at 
a macro level. Bricolage Prior work evaluated the valuable role of institutional 
entrepreneurs and “intellectual bricolage” discussed by Levi-Strauss (Douglas, 1987: 66). 
Although this work has made strong contributions towards understanding the 
phenomenon at a macro level, limited research exists using entrepreneurial bricolage, at a 
micro level of institutional change, focusing on how organizations relate to their local 
environments (Campbell, 2004).  
 
     Currently limited research exists on institutional change and the obsolescence that is 
created as social and cognitive understandings shift and evolves as a program progress 
and the use of bricolage. One important mechanism within in literature is the impact of 
behaviours towards rules.  Baker & Nelson 2005 describe bricoleurs evaluating the extent 
to which standards were important and then deliberately flaunting or breaking the rules, 
ignoring such standards or considering them as an opportunity to “get away with” novel 
solutions. Alternatively, Garud and Karnoe 2003 describe rule shaping through within the 
wind turbine industry to create the dominant industrial design. There is limited research 
in evaluating bricolage and institutions; and rule shaping and breaking behaviours using 
bricolage have not been considered together in response to institutional change. As rule 
breakers, it would seem unusual for bricoleurs to become involved in a Government 
program that required rule following. But desperate times called for desperate measures. 
The GL program appeared to be one way that new firms could ride out the turbulence of 
the GFC and have some say on the institutional rules being developed. It is these themes 
we consider in the following case analysis. 
 
 
 
METHOD 
 
     This research evaluates three housing sustainability assessment firms. This sample 
was chosen owing to ITS numerous strengths.  First, these firms were drawn from the 
CAUSEE project, a four-year PSED type longitudinal study focusing on firm emergence 
including new firms defined as both nascent firms (essentially businesses in an active 
start-up phase but not yet trading) and young firms (who commenced trading from 2004) 
(Davidsson et al., 2008). This enables us to compare these firms against a large random 
sample. Second, the case study data captured information prior to, during and after the 
GL program.  This provides a picture of rich, evolving behavioural responses to the 
program and resource behaviours in response to the changing institutional logics and 
shifts. 
 
     The total CAUSEE wave one respondents (n=1,186) were first analysed to locate 
sustainability firms. Two independent coders then used a predefined codebook (Cohen et 
al., 2009) to evaluate the descriptions based on terms such as “energy” and “sustainable” 
amongst others. The inter-rater reliability was checked and the Kappa’s co-efficient was 
found to be within the acceptable range (0.746). 85 firms fulfilled the criteria given for 
inclusion in the sustainability cohort. We then reviewed these 85 firms to seek firms who 
were sustainability consultants and selected the three firms used in this analysis. These 
firms dealt exclusively with building sustainability assessment and or conservation of 
buildings. We commenced with a thorough review of the themes within institutional 
literature and designed an inductive study to generate grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). We conducting semi-structured face-to-face interviews with lead entrepreneurs, 
and sought in-depth accounts of how the business commenced and then the GFC 
considered a critical juncture for the firm (Vohora, Wright, & Lockett, 2004). We asked 
further questions connected to resource decisions and bricolage as a response to the GFC 
and other constraints they faced during this period. Each first round interview lasted one 
to two hours. We recorded and transcribed all interviews and made extensive handwritten 
notes. We iterated frequently between our data and the literature to check evolving 
themes.  
 
     The subsequent rounds of telephone interviews occurred every 3 months and lasted 
between 40 and 90 minutes.  They evolved from an unstructured and exploratory 
approach to a semi-structured questionnaire and in an attempt to capture process change 
(Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) we further developed a short question approach, similar to 
Lichtenstein and Brush (2001) where firms were emailed every month when they weren’t 
interviewed. We conducted a total of 18 interviews with the lead entrepreneurs, and 
compared that with Industry Questionnaires, CAUSEE survey data, onsite visits and 
secondary documentation (website analysis, resumes, and business plans where 
 
 
available). Interviews with relevant Government and Association members also occurred 
in an attempt to map out the full picture of the evolving institutional dynamics. We 
generated case reports for each firm based on primary data collected through interviews 
of the founding entrepreneurs of the firms, and also used secondary data available about 
each firm. We engaged in cross-case comparisons (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009) of these 
case reports to discover patterns and variations among the firms of behaviors to overcome 
the GL programs flaws 
     
 
RESULTS 
 
BACKGROUND AND INSTITUTIONAL SHIFTS 
 
     The Australian Federal Government implemented the GL program which commenced 
on the 1st of July 2009.  The program was designed to assist home energy efficiency 
through sustainability assessments, and was coupled with access to an interest free Green 
Loan product of up to $10,000 to induce home owners to make behavioural changes 
around water and energy reductions. The program had a budget of $300 million dollars 
and an expected duration of four years (Bita & Owens, 2010). 
     To become involved in the GL program, entrepreneurs needed to become members of 
the Australian Building Sustainability Association (ABSA), complete training in 
sustainability assessment, undertake a police check and hold appropriate public liability 
insurance (ABSA 2010).  Assessors were responsible for sourcing and generating their 
own leads and sales within a defined territory and after a household agreed to an 
assessment, the entrepreneur then had to contact the Federal Government and the 
arrangements through a telephone booking system. The Government provided detailed 
forms that firms used to conduct home assessments and the information collected was 
then sent back to the Government. The Federal Government then sent the household a 
report detailing ways to make their house more energy efficient.  Firms involved in the 
program needed to book the appointments through the Government call centre and 
subsequently received $200 per appointment.  
     Owing to the rush to implement the GL program, many issues were not ironed out 
prior to its national release. The program was assigned to junior public servants with little 
or no training in procurement and many senior bureaucrats in the environmental 
department were not aware of the problems in the loans scheme until November 2009 
(Arup and Moreton 2010).  
 
 
     A program design decision to not cap the number of assessors in combination with the 
programs popularity ensured an explosion of the number of assessors accredited for GL 
(Faulkner, 2010). At commencement in June 2009, up to 1,500 assessors were envisaged 
for the program. By January 2010, there were 3,119 contracted assessors in the program. 
On 19 February, when faced with far more assessments being done than the Government 
anticipated, the minister Mr Garrett announced a redesign of the GL program that would 
apply at the end of 2010 including 
 a new cap of 5000 assessors, allowing up to an extra 1200 trained assessors to 
contract with the Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts; 
 a weekly cap of 15,000 assessment bookings and a daily and weekly cap per 
assessor of three and five respectively to ensure greater quality and a more even 
distribution of work for assessors right around the nation; changed booking 
arrangements allowing only individual assessors to make bookings  
 the discontinuation of the less popular loans component in March 2010 to 
provide for the significant boost to assessment availability (Garrett 2010).  
     At that time, there were approximately 4,200 assessors who had contracts with the 
Federal Government to carry out the work, another 3,000 accredited assessors who were 
waiting for contracts and a third group awaiting accreditation.  More assessors under this 
new capped scheme meant more competition for already scarce resources. Noting 
problems in the program after its shift from the Department of the Environment, Water, 
Heritage and the Arts to Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (DCCEE) 
in April 2010, the new minister for the portfolio Penny Wong requested three separate 
inquiries into the GL program. The Auditor General report (2010) indicated a widespread 
“lack of compliance with the principles, guidelines and regulations relating to program 
procurement; insufficient controls over the demand‐driven aspects of the program 
(namely assessors and assessments); weak budgetary control; inadequate program 
support systems; and poor record keeping”(pg 14).  
 
     The Faulkner Report (2010) also highlighted:  
  96 per cent of contracts signed for Green Loans did not go to competitive tender 
and 75 per cent of those were offered directly to just one company. 
 Many contracts were poorly drawn up, with many giving advanced payments of 
up to 50 per cent. In several instances payments were made without requiring 
program milestones to be achieved. 
     The Auditor General report (2010) found the poor intake of the loans component of 
the program occurred as a consequence of  delays in dispatching assessment reports to the 
householder.  In response to this problem the Federal Government offered a $50 Green 
Reward to households that received a Green Loans home sustainability assessment on or 
 
 
before 11 May 2010. These however, were not properly distributed, adding further 
disappointment to the households involved in the GL program.  
 
     The program continued until July 2010, when Government announced that the GL 
program would cease and that it would transition to the new Green Start program on the 1 
Jan 2011. The Green Start program was to provide energy assessments to assist 
households to become sustainable through information and advice. (DCCEE 2012).  
However, after consideration of a number of reports and Departmental assessments. the 
Green Start program however was shelved in December 2010 by the DCCEE on the 
grounds that it was too "risky". As a consequence the Green Loans scheme was shut 
down in February 28 2011. 
 
CASE RESPONSE TO THE GL PROGRAM 
 
     As the GFC unfolded, all cases began to feel its influence on their existing customers.   
     Sue Newton noted  
“A lot of the development projects are now on hold or have been on hold.”  
 
     Les Western suggested 
“The global financial crisis had impact on some commercial customers of ours. So 
Timber Corp. was one of them, which I think was a forestry and agricultural business. 
They got into trouble, which meant that a whole program of work that we had didn't 
continue, so that's caused a significant change in terms on what we tend to focus on, we 
don’t focus on agribusiness anymore, where we had.” 
 
     They turned to the GL program as a means of income during this period of time.  
After signing up for the training, Sue Newton expressed her doubts on the program and 
the way it was being managed.  Specifically, she described the process of becoming 
involved in the GL program. 
“I’ve done this training… so the GL program won’t give me any information until I’m 
accredited.  I’ve parting with $3000 to get accredited before I find out exactly what I’m 
required to do. Having to deal with a Government scheme is a pain in the arse from a 
business perspective.  The paperwork involved is ridiculous and it outweighs the benefit.”  
 
     She further recognised the training and the program was not nuanced enough to 
recognise different climatic conditions and impacted they way she provided the service in 
 
 
the tropics where the average winter temperature is 25c/76f .  She had to break a number 
of rules as the program didn't fit the local context.  
“We were trained by somebody who comes from Canberra.  He thought he could tell us 
about how to design in the tropics which is not the same...  He had no idea… So the 
people who are getting trained are potentially wrong information..We heard a lot about 
column heaters [though we live in the tropics]”.  
 
     Implementing the proposed Government responses was akin to market suicide as it 
would ruin her business reputation. Ms. Newton offered, “Its crazy…There is a lot of 
focus on bulk insulation, whereas in the tropics, reflective insulation is often better. Also 
ventilation of the roof space to expel hot air is a great recommendation, but this 
suggestion is not available.”  
 
     Although she provided the Government report to her clients (indicating its 
irrelevancy), Newton also provided a personalised response for all the GL bookings she 
made using bricolage behaviours tapping into prior knowledge and resources she had on 
hand. She evaluated house positions and attempted to evaluate ways to use cross-breezes 
to cool homes. Seeing issues within the program, she attempted to influence the program 
through emails and lobbying to highlight the irrelevancy, obsolescence and flaws with the 
program.  
“I did write, written submissions in, in response to getting really upset about the 
responses it was turning out, the recommendations. Like, it is supposed to be a green loan 
program, so I was very upset about how it's been bureaucracized and the - what people 
have been spending their money on is really targeted at insulation, solar panels for their 
roof and for their hot water, which is all very well, but there are lots of other things that 
people can do to reduce their air conditioning consumption and that's not covered by this 
loan. And it's like, well, why isn't it? So we got pretty upset about that, and that fact that 
it doesn't even consider the things that would make the house cooler in the first place.”  
Nothing changed.  
 
    She attempted to extend her relationships with other assessors in the area to discuss 
these issues and though the meetings were of some benefit and enabled the assessors to 
compare notes, no systematic group response towards institutional flaws occurred. 
 
     Owing to the various shifts within the program (for example the program was titled 
Green Loans without a green loan component), assessors found they had to difficulty in 
marketing the program and explaining the benefit to householders.  Constant shifts and 
uncertainty in when the program provided some opportunities (extension of existing 
skills and networks) but it also provided constraints.  There were challenges in setting 
 
 
appointments as no one knew when the program would officially close and it was 
difficult for assess whether to continue or seek other business opportunities.  Additional 
flaws in the booking system and a complete shutdown of the booking system owing to a 
technical glitch ensured entrepreneurs could not conduct assessments for 5 weeks and 
often spent up to 45 mins waiting to make a booking.  
“We weren't able to make a booking in the system because the government system had 
broken.  The booking system was not working, so....its incredibly frustrating to be part of 
a program that you can't make bookings in when you actually do have them.”  
 
 As a consequence, Les Newton like other firms (Stafford 2010) considered hiring 
marketing company to manage the booking process  
 “You could hire a cold calling company who would call around and get you leads, which 
you'd pay for.”  
     But the costs and the Federal Government in November 2010 prohibited cold calling 
effectively shutting down that opportunity.  
 
     The second case, like Newton, attempted to change the obvious flaws of obsolete 
elements in the program.  Les Western talked with competitors and they put together a 
joint proposal for the Green Start program to suggest revisions to the program. Western 
described this strategy by saying, “we collaborated with two competitors and went for 
it...Way out of our league by ourselves, but the three of us together – we felt we had a 
chance.”  
 
     The proposal under submission was viewed favourably and discussions had occurred 
between the network partners and Government.  In the end however the GL program was 
shut down after 1.5 years rather than the proposed 4 years, which meant 10,000 trained 
assessors became either underemployed or faced firm failure. Some new firms faced 
difficulties and closed including Sue Newton.  
 
    Les Western and some others managed to survive. He went on to develop a successful 
proposal at the state government level to run a similar program, but on his own terms (in 
part, shaped by his experience of putting the proposal together with his competitors). He 
then hired the small operators from the GL program cheaply via his existing relationship 
with ABSA, as they had no work because of the GL program failure, enabling further 
business growth. 
 
     Whilst we were prepared to find both rule breaking and rule shaping behaviors in 
response to the GL program, surprisingly we also find one case Clay Ilv who actually 
 
 
attempted to reinforce the existing program as he believed that even though it was 
flawed, it was perfect as a strategy to keep his competitors busy. He promoted the 
program throughout the local suburb using bricolage combinations of existing 
knowledge, and developed active discussions used promotion within his networks.   He 
never registered as an assessor or completed any loans himself.   
 
“The Green Loans created opportunities for me to cement my hold in my niche market.  
It tied them up with lots of work and it was project work which ties up a lot of resources. 
It was perfect.” 
   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
     Initial results highlight how bricoleurs often exhibit work arounds to acknowledged 
flaws within institutions.  For some, it was deliberate rule breaking in some instances 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005) and in other instances it was running novel solutions in parallel 
to appease both the market demand and conform to existing institutional arrangements.  
The results further indicate the use of rule shaping (Garud & Karnoe, 2003): whereby 
firms walk a fine line to co-exist within and between the rules to influence the emerging 
institutional field. We build on prior work of Baker and Nelson (2005) and Garud and 
Karnoe (2003) to evaluate both rule breaking and rule shaping within a local 
environment.  Surprisingly we also fine rule reinforcement of the existing program as a 
behavior in one the cases.   
 
     One mechanism that may influence the success in attempts to shift institutional logics 
is networks. Whilst both Les and Sue extended their networks in an attempt to influence 
institutional structures, Les was more successful as he and his stakeholders did manage to 
get their foot in the door to begin discussions about the program.  More research into 
what mechanisms enables or hinders these behavioral responses using bricolage in 
attempts to influence institutional change is needed.  
  
     An obvious recommendation is a better designed program whereby firms would not 
need to manage the institutional constraints and suffer the consequences of them (Sue 
Newton closed her business late December 2010.)  However, assuming these flaws, a 
recommendation for practice is that a more holistic approach should be considered with 
more flexible programs, clearer communication and set dates for program completion.  
This may assist firms in planning future behaviours, potentially enabling better 
performance and growth in the long term.   
 
 
 
     Although our results illustrate further extension of bricolage theory and its use in 
investigating how entrepreneurs may influence institutional structures, we stress that 
these results represent only the first steps in providing a greater understanding of 
bricolage decisions under institutional constraints As we continue our longitudinal study 
of bricolage in this case analysis, we will be able to develop and test much more nuanced 
theories of bricolage behaviours, processes and explain far ranging impacts of the 
relationship between firms attempts to produce novel solutions through rule breaking and 
rule shaping.  Future research might also examine, the impact of relationships in 
influencing resource combinations, and the use of networks to shift institutional logics 
using bricolage decisions. 
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